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Abstract  
We used bank-level data of Indonesian commercial banks to examine the role of bank 
capital in bank lending. Indonesian commercial bank capitalization has improved 
with the implementation of bank restructuring programs after the Asian financial 
crisis. The capital adequacy ratio has returned to a sound level; however, bank loan 
disbursement continues to remain low. We examine the bank lending channel in 
Indonesian banks and investigate the effects of monetary policy on bank lending 
through bank capital. The results indicate that a well-capitalized bank can increase its 
provisions of bank loans while still not responding to monetary policy, excepting 
non-forex banks. 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
Bank capitalization is an important issue in monetary policy; however, traditional 
monetary theory has largely ignored the role of bank equity (Van den Heuvel 2002). In 
research on monetary policy transmission mechanisms, two types of views have 
emerged: one is the money view, which emphasizes the effects of monetary instruments 
like interest rates, and the other is the credit view, which places importance on bank 
credit. The latter is also called the bank lending channel which focuses on the effects of 
bank provision on bank lending. In the bank lending channel, bank equity is less 
considered for bank lending. It was only recently that bank equity has been taken into 
account in the context of the “bank lending channel” (Kishan and Opiela 2000, 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004). In contrast, the bank capital channel focuses on the 
effects of bank capital on bank lending. Both channels are derived from the failed 
Modigliani-Miller theorem for banks. In a Modigliani-Miller world of perfect capital 
markets, a bank’s lending decisions are independent of its financial structure. Because 
the bank will always be able to finance any profitable lending opportunities, the level of 
bank capital is irrelevant to lending. In the bank lending channel if all banks always 
have sufficient liquidities, there is no lending channel, and in the bank capital channel, 
the risk-based capital requirements of the Basle Accord and an imperfect market for 
bank equity are prerequisite. Those conditions imply a failure of the Modigliani-Miller 
logic for the bank (Van den Heuvel 2002). 
In Indonesia, after the Asian financial crisis from 1997–1998, the capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) sharply declined to -24.6% due to the heavy devaluation of rupiah 
following the crisis (Figure 1). At that time, most of the Indonesian commercial banks 
fell into capital deficits—restructuring programs were implemented, and ailing banks 
were either bailed out or liquidated. Bank capital has since recovered to an adequate 
level; however, while the soundness of banks has recovered, bank lending remains low. 
Against this background, we focus on bank capital and examine the relationship 
between bank capital and bank lending. The purpose of this paper is to address the 
question empirically whether the capital level of a bank affects bank lending. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the related 
literature on bank lending and bank capital. Section 3 describes the Indonesian banking 
sector structure and monetary policy. Section 4 discusses the empirical analysis, data, 
models, and results. Section 6 concludes. 
 Figure 1: Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 1995–2015 
  
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics. 
 
 
 
2. Related literature 
Recent research on bank capital focuses on the capital buffer, which is the difference 
between the CAR and the minimum Basel capital requirement; it investigates the 
relationship between capital buffers and business cycles. Some studies have pointed out 
the pro-cyclical relationship between the business cycle and the capital buffer, 
indicating a negative relationship between the two (Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina 2004, 
Stolz and Wedow 2011, Jokipii and Milne 2008, Francis and Osborne 2009). Other 
studies found a counter-cycle with a positive relationship (Bikker and Metzemakers 
2005, Jokipii and Milne 2008, Lai and Konishi 2014). 
Diverging from the subject of business cycles, role of bank capital as lending channel 
are investigated (Kishan and Opiela 2000, Van den Heuvel 2002, Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli 2004, Kishan and Opiela 2006). In the bank lending channel theorem the 
effects of reserve requirements on demand deposits were focused on while no attention 
is paid to bank equity (Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004). 
Several researchers take into account CAR under the Basel capital requirements in 
augmenting the bank capital channel (Bolton and Freixas 2006, Van den Heuvel 2002). 
Some have pointed out that if the capital is insufficient for the Basel capital 
requirements, banks may decrease their lending (Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004, 
Berrospide and Edge 2010). At the same time, if banks hold capital beyond the 
minimum capital requirement, they incur costs; however, if banks violate the minimum 
capital regulations, different costs will arise, such as regulatory intervention. Therefore, 
banks have incentives to hold excess capital as insurance in order to avoid violating 
regulations (Stolz, Heid and Porath 2003). 
According to the bank capital channel theorem, monetary policy affects bank lending 
in part through its impact on bank equity capital (Van den Heuvel 2002). As a first 
prerequisite to the bank capital channel, banks’ capital markets must be incomplete, and 
they cannot easily issue shares due to agency cost and tax disadvantage. Secondly, 
banks are subject to interest rate risk because their assets typically have a longer 
maturity than liability (maturity mismatch), and it is necessary that they comply with 
the regulatory minimum capital requirements (Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004). 
 
 
3. The Indonesian banking sector structure and monetary policy 
3.1 Structure of the Indonesian banking sector 
The Indonesian commercial banking sector comprises five types of banks, which are 
categorized by ownership: state-owned banks, regional development banks, private 
banks, joint banks, and foreign banks (Table 1). Private banks are divided into two types 
based on their foreign exchange operations: foreign exchange banks (forex banks) and 
non-foreign exchange banks (non-forex banks). The Indonesian government holds more 
than 60% of the total shares of state-owned banks, regional governments hold regional 
development banks, domestic capital owns private banks, domestic capital and foreign 
capital hold joint banks, and foreign banks are branches of foreign banks overseas. 
 
Insert Table 1 here. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates banks’ excess capital, which is the difference between their CAR 
and the Basel regulatory requirements. The condition of bank capital was much 
improved by 2009 compared to 1998, reflecting the government’s strengthening of 
prudential regulations. The level of excess capital varies with bank type. Due to the 
Asian crisis, state-owned banks had a capital deficit until 1999, after which 
restructuring programs like capital injection improved state-owned banks’ financial 
soundness and increased capital. Since the early 2000s, the level of excess capital has 
remained stable at around 10%. Excess capital of forex banks is relatively higher, at 
33.7% in 1999 and 25.9% in 2000; since then, it has been maintained at 13–20%. 
Non-forex banks’ excess capital is always been maintained at a higher level of 20–35%. 
Joint banks hold very high levels of excess capital, ranging from 30–50%. Foreign 
banks and regional development banks keep their excess capital at around 25% and 13%, 
respectively. The level of excess capital varies with bank type, and since 2006, 
non-forex banks, joint banks, and foreign banks have increased their levels of excess 
capital. 
 
Figure 2: Excess capital by bank type 
 
Source: Ekofin Konsulindo, Indonesian Banking Indicators. 
 
In order to examine the differences in capitalization among bank types more closely, 
we compared the mean and median values of the excess capital in the large and small 
banks measured in the banks’ total assets (Figure 3).  
  
Figure 3: Comparison of excess capital in small banks and large banks 
 
Source: Ekofin Konsulindo, Indonesian Banking Indicators. 
  
Large banks are defined as banks with total assets in the upper 75th percentile of all 
banks; small banks are defined as those with a total asset amount below the 25th 
percentile of all banks. In the mean value, we found that the difference between the 
large bank and the small bank was large, with a gap of around 20%, but in the median 
value, there was little practical difference between large banks and small banks. Small 
banks have rapidly increased their capital ratio beginning in the second half of 2007.  
Figure 4 illustrates trends in gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates. The 
economic growth rate began to slow in the second half of 2007, after which the growth 
rate fell sharply due to the global financial crisis in 2008. The sharp increases in excess 
capital of the small banks may reflect the declining trend of economic growth, as most 
of the small banks are non-forex banks. Non-forex banks operate in a limited area and 
do not have many branches, so their funding sources are not as strong as government 
and forex banks. Therefore, their cost of funds index is the highest among all of the 
types of banks (Table 1), and they were most susceptible to the economic downturn. 
Table 2 compares bank performance by bank size. In 2007, the return on equity (ROE) 
of the small banks fell into the negative, -1.2% in June 2007 and -0.1% in December 
2007, while large banks’ ROE are 22.9% and 19.2% respectively. These low profits 
result in reduced capital accumulation; therefore, the banks may increase their capital as 
a precautionary measure so as not to violate regulations.  
 
Figure 4: GDP growth rate (2001–2013) 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics. 
 
 
Insert Table 2 here. 
  
3.2 Monetary policy transmission mechanisms in Indonesia 
While bank capital has increased and bank soundness has recovered, bank lending 
remains sluggish (Figure 5). Before the crisis, the ratio of bank lending to GDP 
surpassed 50%, whereas after the crisis, it dropped sharply to less than 20% due to the 
transfer of massive non-performing loans to a national assets management agency, the 
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). Since then, bank lending has continued 
to be low, with a ratio under 40% to GDP. 
 
Figure 5: Ratio of bank lending to GDP (1995–2016) 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics. 
 
Goeltom (2008) explained the results of the survey conducted by Bank Indonesia 
about the monetary transmission mechanism through the interest rate channel in 
Indonesia in the pre-crisis period (before the Asian financial crisis of 1997) and the 
post-crisis period (after 2000). In the post-crisis period, a changing policy rate was 
transmitted to the real sector to various retail banking rates. The banks’ response to the 
policy rate decrease was to reduce their deposit rates and decrease SBI(Sertifikat Bank 
Indonesia) which is the central bank certificates, holdings in their portfolios, and 
increase their loan portfolios. The survey results indicated an opposite movement 
between policy rates and loans. As Table 3 shows, SBI is a major investment in banks’ 
portfolios. 
 
Insert Table 3 here. 
  
Figure 6 shows trends of interest rate and bank lending growth from 2003–2015. As 
Goeltom (2008) mentioned, the trends of loan growth and interest rate, which are 
calculated by policy rate minus inflation rate (consumer price index [CPI]), move in 
opposite directions.  
Wulandari (2012) assessed the role of the two monetary transmission mechanism 
channels in managing inflation and contributing to economic growth in Indonesia, 
finding that the two channels played different roles in influencing the real sector. 
Further, while the interest rate channel was important for managing inflation, the credit 
bank lending channel still dominated economic growth. 
 
Figure 6: Policy rate and consumer price index (CPI) (2000–2016) 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics. 
 
 Figure 7: Interest rate and bank lending growth 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics. 
Note: Interest rate is the real interest rate, which is calculated by policy rate minus inflation rate (CPI). Loan growth 
is a semiannual growth rate. 
 
Hamada (2016) examined the determinants of excess capital in four Indonesian bank 
groups: government banks (state-owned banks and regional development banks), forex 
banks, non-forex banks, and foreign banks (joint banks and foreign banks). ROE as a 
proxy for the direct costs of capital (Jokipii and Milne, 2008) has a negative and 
significant effect on excess capital, which is measured by differences between the risk 
weighted CAR and regulatory minimal capital requirements, except for foreign banks. 
Concerning the relationship between excess capital and business cycles, GDP growth 
rate affects the excess capital of forex and non-forex banks. This implies that during an 
economic upturn, forex and non-forex banks increase their capital because the cost of 
capital funding is lower. 
Hamada (2016) examined the effect of bank capital on loan growth in Indonesia, a 
well-capitalized bank could increase its credit. In other words, smaller banks such as 
non-forex and joint banks with lower fundraising capabilities should increase their 
capital in order to increase their credit. 
 
  
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Dataset and empirical model 
Our dataset was comprised of 118 banks: 4 state-owned banks, 34 forex banks, 30 
non-forex banks, 15 joint banks, 9 foreign banks, and 26 regional development banks, 
all of which were in a database of Indonesian banking indicators, provided by Ekofin 
Konsulindo in Jakarta, Indonesia. 
We examined the effects of bank capital on bank loan growth using a fixed effects 
model and a random effects model of panel data regressions; we used the banks’ 
semiannual financial data from 1998–2009. We estimated the effects of bank capital 
using the following equation (1): 
 
 (1), 
 
where Y is the dependent variable (i.e., semiannual bank loan growth rate). X is a vector 
of basic characteristics of individual banks: the bank book value of total assets, return 
on assets (ROA), and non-performing loan rate. Z is the macro economy (i.e., GDP 
growth rate, interest rate, inflation rate). The CAPITAL_DUMMY variable comprises 
LOW and HIGH. LOW represents a poorly capitalized bank, which is given a value of 1 
when the bank’s equity ratio, which is calculated by its total equity divided by its total 
assets, is below the 25th percentile of all banks; otherwise, it is given a value of 0. 
HIGH represents a well-capitalized bank, which is given a value of 1 when the bank’s 
equity ratio is in the 75th percentile; otherwise, it is given a value of 0. Finally, ε 
represents error terms.  
 
Insert Table 4 here. 
 
In addition to Equation (1), we used Equation (2) to examine the interaction terms of the 
CAPITAL_DUMMY and the interest rate. 
 
 (2) 
 
These equations allowed us to examine how bank capital level affects bank lending 
behaviors. The most interesting variables were CAPITAL_Dummy and the interaction 
terms. The interaction terms for CAPITAL_Dummy and interest rate were used to 
examine the effects of monetary policy on bank lending through bank capital. We 
expected that the effects of monetary tightening would be smaller for banks with higher 
capital ratios, as they have easier access to uninsured financing (Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli 2004). 
Table 5 compares the major indicators of poorly capitalized banks, hereafter, LOW, 
and well-capitalized banks, hereafter, HIGH. A t-test was used to compare the averages 
of the LOW and HIGH. Concerning profitability, measured by ROA and net interest 
margin (NIM), HIGH were more profitable than LOW. As for efficiency, the operational 
expense ratio (OER) of HIGH was lower than it was for LOW, which implies that HIGH 
are more efficient than LOW. The loan to deposit ratio (LDR) and the ratio of total 
credit to total assets, which represents the financial intermediary function, were higher 
in HIGH than in LOW. In general, HIGH’ performance was better than LOW’; and there 
is a decisive difference between them. Table 1 shows the major indicators of the 
Indonesian banking sector from 1997–2009. Regarding CAR, which is a Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) minimal requirement, private non-forex banks, joint 
banks, and foreign banks’ CARs were very high (greater than 40%). 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
 
4.2 Regression results 
The results of the estimation of loan growth are summarized in Table 6. We estimated 
the models using fixed effects panel regressions for Models I, II, III, and V and a 
random effects panel regression for Model IV.
1
 Our main focus was the coefficients of 
the CAPITAL_DUMMY and the interaction terms of the CAPITAL_DUMMY and interest 
rate. The coefficients of HIGH were positive and significant for Model I, III, and IV, 
while the coefficients of LOW of all models except Model V were negative but not 
significant. This implies that a well-capitalized bank tends to increase its loan 
provisions more so than do other banks. In Model II for government banks, the 
coefficients of both HIGH and LOW were negative and not significant. This indicates 
that government banks’ behavior could be different from other types of private banks. 
Hamada (2016) warned of the possibility of a moral hazard for government banks 
                                                   
1
 We tested the null hypothesis that an individual effect does not exist using the F-test. The null hypothesis was 
rejected for all specifications. We further tested the null hypothesis that the individual effect was correlated with 
regressors using Hausman’s specification test. The null hypothesis was rejected for specification Models I, II, III, and 
V, but not for Model IV. We used the fixed effects model to estimate the regression equations for Models I, II, III, and 
V and used the random effects model for Model IV. 
concerning determinants of bank capital because banks’ excess capital has negatively 
related risk factors (Francis and Osborne, 2012). In other words, government banks can 
take more risks than private banks based on an implicit guarantee by the government; 
thus, government banks’ lending behavior might be different from other banks. 
Concerning the interaction terms, the results of HIGH_iINT_RATE were significant 
for Model (1) of I and Model (7) of IV, but they were negative. This means that 
well-capitalized banks respond to changing monetary policy better than poorly 
capitalized banks. This finding was the opposite of what we expected. Except for Model 
I for all banks, the results were significant only for non-forex banks. As we mentioned 
in Section 3, non-forex banks increase their capital as a precautionary measure during 
economic downturns due to their weak funding capacities; therefore, we assume that 
well-capitalized non-forex banks are more vulnerable to economic environment 
changes.  
Regarding other explanatory variables, bank size measured by ASSET negatively 
affected loan growth. ROA had a less obvious effect on loan growth. Bank profitability 
had no significant effect on bank loan provision. Bank risk measured by non-performing 
loan (NPL) negatively affected loan growth, but it was significant for all banks (Model 
I), government banks (Model II), and foreign ownership banks (Model V). GDP growth 
had a positive effect on government banks, but it had no effect on any other type of 
bank. Finally, policy rate (INT_RATE) negatively affected loan growth, except for in 
government banks, it suggests that government banks may act on different principles 
from other banks The effect of CPI on changing in bank lending was not clear. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
We investigated the role of bank capital in bank lending using bank-level data from 
Indonesian commercial banks. Indonesian commercial bank capitalization improved 
with the implementation of bank restructuring programs after the Asian financial crisis. 
CARs have returned to an acceptable level; however, bank loan disbursement has 
remained low. We focused on the bank lending channel in Indonesian banks and 
investigated the effects of monetary policy on bank lending through bank capital. The 
results indicate that well-capitalized banks can increase their provision of bank loans, 
except in the case of government banks, but cannot respond to monetary policy, except 
in the case of non-forex bank. which turned out that the result varies depending on the 
type of bank, especially, government banks’ behavior could be different from other 
types of private banks. 
In this paper only the effects of bank lending channel is examined, but not sufficiently 
verified bank capital channel due to the data limitation. As future subject investigation 
of the bank capital channel precisely is necessary in order to address to the question of 
why Indonesia's sluggish banking sector and declining financial intermediation function 
are occurring. 
 
 
 Table 1: Major bank indicators of the Indonesian banking sector (1997–2009) 
  
  Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation  
Minimum Maximum 
Total asset        (Billons of rupiah) 
State Owned Bank 128,000 370,000 0 97,300 117,000 
Private Forex Bank 13,800 281,000 0 30,100 2,052 
Private Non-forex Bank 657 22,300 9 1,515 270 
Joint Bank 3,390 27,900 16 3,919 1,992 
Foreign Bank 11,900 52,400 278 11,600 8,900 
Regional Development Bank 3,389 32,400 39 4,499 1,624 
Return on assets（ROA）         (%) 
State Owned Bank -1.89 1.62 15.6 -93.31 5.77 
Private Forex Bank 0.44 1.41 9.4 -152.99 20 
Private Non-forex Bank 0.58 1.09 5.41 -58.06 15.21 
Joint Bank 2.72 3.03 10.46 -111.74 82.04 
Foreign Bank 3.36 3.28 4.84 -28.82 33.73 
Regional Development Bank 3.16 3.43 3.34 -24.36 13.6 
Return on equity（ROE）          (%) 
State Owned Bank 32.19 22.74 139.74 -388.74 1291.81 
Private Forex Bank 6.12 10.16 105.09 -1769.12 1557.23 
Private Non-forex Bank -3.69 5.49 76.28 -942.37 718.82 
Joint Bank 17.74 13.69 84.61 -351.14 1502.01 
Foreign Bank 72.09 18.32 342.37 -782.47 4405.27 
Regional Development Bank 19.62 25.54 66.14 -917.44 420.74 
Net Interest Margin (NIM)           (%) 
State Owned Bank 3.49 4.44 5.74 -20.58 12.25 
Private Forex Bank 4.83 4.98 4.67 -40.61 59.52 
Private Non-forex Bank 6.39 5.92 5.69 -20.26 65.34 
Joint Bank 5.26 4.42 4.24 -19.72 36.25 
Foreign Bank 4.53 4 3.53 -8 33.35 
Regional Development Bank 8.98 8.9 4.67 -9.83 60.99 
Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR)            (%) 
State Owned Bank 64.38 58.27 26.6 24.66 177.85 
Private Forex Bank 67.99 69.5 37.19 0 672.99 
Private Non-forex Bank 68.27 71.04 31.97 0 247.38 
Joint Bank 192.6 119.1 484.96 0 7237 
Foreign Bank 75.46 64.97 55.79 0 334.97 
Regional Development Bank 59.96 54.13 49.6 11.06 969.41 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (BIS Minimal requirements)       (%) 
State Owned Bank 9.94 16.35 29.41 -149.21 90.6 
Private Forex Bank 25.78 17.28 34.64 -77.05 429.05 
Private Non-forex Bank 48.36 20.37 164.07 -167.94 2529.42 
Joint Bank 74.48 28.11 336.3 -69.56 5049.71 
Foreign Bank 40.21 24.1 50.65 0 461.21 
Regional Development Bank 21.35 19.78 10.02 -12.53 72.06 
Non-performing Loan（NPL）           (%) 
State Owned Bank 14.6 6.01 19.21 2.62 89.09 
Private Forex Bank 11.83 3.6 54.69 0 1457.42 
Private Non-forex Bank 13.04 3.64 40.52 0 682.31 
Joint Bank 18.24 6.96 28.6 0 358.53 
Foreign Bank 15.45 7.4 18.93 0 80.66 
Regional Development Bank 5.94 2.4 10.65 0 75.04 
Interest Expense*           
State Owned Bank 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.36 
Private Forex Bank 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.00 1.13 
Private Non-forex Bank 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.02 1.67 
Joint Bank 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.98 
Foreign Bank 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.23 
Regional Development Bank 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.27 
Source: Ekofin Konsulindo, Indonesian Banking Indicators. 
Note: Interest expense represents the ratio of interest expense to total funds. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Comparison of bank performance by bank size 
 ROA ROE NIM NPL 
 SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE 
1997/12 2.42% 1.43% 9.4% 33.2% 7.8% 4.0% . . 
1998/6 1.17% -0.77% 0.0% 82.2% 4.9% 1.0% . . 
1998/12 -2.57% -40.40% -26.9% 191.7% 9.0% -4.6% 41.3% 64.3% 
1999/6 -0.42% -5.13% 0.7% 31.6% 3.6% -1.8% 84.3% 41.7% 
1999/12 -0.49% -11.08% -89.8% 229.2% 6.1% -2.3% 38.0% 47.9% 
2000/6 -0.15% -0.44% -6.9% 10.8% 4.0% 0.9% 29.7% 35.1% 
2000/12 0.63% 1.06% 8.0% 47.2% 5.3% 2.6% 13.2% 18.7% 
2001/6 1.87% 1.15% -0.2% 17.8% 6.2% 3.3% 10.5% 18.3% 
2001/12 2.35% 1.11% 20.4% -18.1% 8.7% 3.4% 6.9% 15.4% 
2002/6 0.96% 2.40% -7.5% 26.6% 5.8% 3.9% 6.6% 9.7% 
2002/12 -0.71% 1.95% -8.9% 13.7% 6.8% 4.0% 5.3% 9.1% 
2003/6 1.32% 2.78% -10.6% 27.7% 5.4% 4.6% 5.8% 5.4% 
2003/12 0.90% 2.52% -7.3% 28.4% 6.5% 5.2% 6.1% 6.0% 
2004/6 2.64% 3.60% 15.8% 32.0% 7.4% 6.4% 6.0% 5.5% 
2004/12 1.66% -2.11% 4.9% 25.2% 8.6% 6.1% 5.3% 4.3% 
2005/6 2.50% 2.87% 14.8% 25.0% 8.9% 6.0% 4.5% 4.5% 
2005/12 1.97% 2.42% 7.9% 21.2% 9.8% 5.8% 3.7% 4.4% 
2006/6 1.57% 2.70% 2.2% 23.0% 7.5% 6.4% 4.4% 4.9% 
2006/12 1.24% 2.66% 2.3% 21.7% 7.8% 6.4% 4.6% 4.1% 
2007/6 0.94% 3.10% -1.2% 22.9% 7.3% 6.4% 5.4% 4.0% 
2007/12 2.07% 2.69% -0.1% 19.2% 7.4% 6.3% 4.9% 2.9% 
2008/6 1.88% 2.42% 3.9% 18.8% 7.2% 6.5% 4.6% 3.0% 
2008/12 1.04% 2.70% 1.3% 19.3% 7.4% 6.4% 2.4% 2.7% 
2009/6 0.63% 2.81% 0.1% 17.3% 7.7% 5.9% 4.9% 4.1% 
2009/12 -0.26% 1.46% -0.3% -1.7% 8.3% 5.9% 5.4% 3.7% 
  
Table 3: Bank assets structure* 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Credit (Rp) 45.2% 33.4% 19.8% 15.7% 18.0% 23.8% 29.0% 34.0% 38.4% 38.6% 40.1% 46.5% 
Credit(USD) 27.1% 41.6% 14.4% 13.4% 12.5% 9.1% 8.4% 9.4% 9.3% 8.8% 10.3% 11.0% 
Credit(Rp+USD) 72.3% 75.0% 34.2% 29.1% 30.6% 32.9% 37.4% 43.5% 47.6% 47.4% 50.4% 57.5% 
BI placement** 3.0% 4.3% 5.4% 7.8% 11.5% 13.5% 15.9% 15.9% 13.8% 18.7% 20.3% 14.3% 
Government bond 0.0% 0.0% 23.9% 45.5% 41.2% 37.3% 30.7% 24.9% 21.4% 18.4% 15.2% 12.7% 
SBI** 0.0% 0.9% 0.9% 2.9% 5.1% 7.5% 9.6% 7.9% 4.8% 9.8% 10.6% 6.5% 
Cash 1.2% 1.3% 1.6% 1.4% 1.3% 1.5% 1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.6% 1.9% 2.2% 
Source: Ekofin Konsulindo, Indonesian Banking Indicators. 
Note: *The percentage of total assets and the average of all banks. ** Central bank placement. *** Central bank certificates. 
 
Table 4: Explanation of variables and descriptive statistics value 
Variables Explanation 
Number of 
obs. 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variable               
LOAN_GROWTH Semiannual loan growth rate 2806 0.15 0.56 0.10 -1.00 15.03 
Explanatory variables 
ASSET Book value of total assets  (billions of rupiah) 2927 10,700 33,400 1,443 9 370,000 
NPL 
Gross non-performing loan rate: total non-performing loan 
divided by total amount of loan 
2681 0.12 0.38 0.04 0.00 14.57 
ROA Return on assets: ratio of net income to average total assets 2923 0.02 0.07 0.02 -1.53 0.24 
GDP Semiannual GDP growth rate 2950 3.55 3.94 4.82 -13.30 6.39 
INT_RATE Monetary policy rate 2950 14.82 10.72 12.33 7.00 58.00 
CPI Consumer Price Index 2950 14.44 16.62 10.03 2.01 77.63 
CAPITAL Dummy        
LOW 
Poorly capitalized bank. If the equity ratio is less than 25 
percentile, it takes 1, otherwise 0. 
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HIGH 
Well capitalized bank. If the equity ratio is more than 75 
percentile, it takes 1, otherwise 0. 
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Table 5: Comparisons of major indicators between low-capitalized and high-capitalized banks 
  ROA ROE NIM OER LDR NPL Equity Ratio INT_PAY 
Credit 
Ratio 
Loan 
Growth 
ASSET 
(Billions of 
rupiah) 
LOW -0.01 0.13 0.04 0.95 0.73 0.17 0.02 0.10 0.47 0.19 13,300 
HIGH 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.78 0.92 0.14 0.26 0.09 0.52 0.13 2,002 
t-value* 8.40*** -0.55 11.30*** -6.37*** 4.43*** -1.29 35.50*** -1.46 4.06*** -1.40 -10.01*** 
All banks 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.84 0.78 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.52 0.15 10,700 
Source: Ekofin Konsulindo, Indonesian Banking Indicators. 
Note: *The results of the t-test are based on LOW. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. ROA is the ratio of net income to average total assets. ROE is the ratio of net income to 
shareholders’ equity. NIM is calculated as the difference between investment return and interest expense divided by average earning assets. OER measures a bank’s profitability or 
efficiency by dividing annualized operating expenses by operating income. LDR is the total loans divided by the sum of collection of funds and core capital. NPL is the banks’ NPLs 
divided by their total loans. The equity ratio is the banks’ total equity to their total assets. INT_PAY represents the expense of interest payments, which is the ratio of interest expense 
to total funds. The credit ratio shows the banks’ intermediary function, which is their total credit divided by their total assets. Loan growth is the semiannual growth rate of the banks’ 
loans. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Regression results on loan growth (All banks, Government banks) 
  I II 
  All banks 
Government banks (State Owned and Regional development 
banks) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.   
ASSET(log) (t-1) -0.108 0.028 *** -0.115 0.028 *** -0.049 0.019 *** -0.054 0.019 *** 
NPL(t-1) -0.054 0.028 * -0.058 0.028 ** -0.419 0.064 *** -0.405 0.064 *** 
ROA(t-1) 0.282 0.151 * 0.218 0.146 
 
0.012 0.104 
 
0.013 0.092 
 
LOW -0.047 0.047 
 
-0.024 0.030 
 
-0.022 0.024 
 
-0.023 0.015 
 
HIGH 0.135 0.049 *** 0.065 0.033 * -0.016 0.039 
 
-0.023 0.017 
 
LOW_int_rate 0.001 0.002 
    
0.000 0.001 
    
HIGH_int_rate -0.004 0.002 * 
   
0.001 0.002 
    
GDP(t-1) -0.012 0.013 
 
-0.011 0.013 
 
0.026 0.007 *** 0.026 0.007 *** 
INT_RATE -0.025 0.011 ** -0.025 0.011 ** 0.013 0.006 ** 0.013 0.006 ** 
CPI -0.003 0.004 
 
-0.003 0.004 
 
-0.003 0.002 
 
-0.003 0.002 
 
CONS 2.176 0.440 *** 2.245 0.440 *** 0.700 0.282 ** 0.778 0.284 *** 
YEAR  yes     yes     yes           
Number of observations 2551     2551     641     641   
R
2
 
 
0.051 
  
0.049 
  
0.231 
  
0.234 
 
  F-value 6.47 *** F-value 6.88 *** F-value 8.89 *** F-value 10.06 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6 Regression Results on Loan growth (Forex banks and Non-forex banks) 
  III IV 
  Forex banks Non forex banks 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
  Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
  
ASSET(log) (t-1) -0.162 0.047 *** -0.180 0.047 *** -0.008 0.035 
 
-0.009 0.035 
 
NPL(t-1) -0.044 0.035 
 
-0.050 0.035 
 
-0.105 0.084 
 
-0.100 0.084 
 
ROA(t-1) 0.352 0.228 
 
0.345 0.224 
 
-0.920 0.762 
 
-1.068 0.757 
 
LOW -0.097 0.078 
 
-0.027 0.048 
 
-0.019 0.125 
 
0.006 0.078 
 
HIGH 0.188 0.074 ** 0.147 0.053 *** 0.321 0.130 ** 0.157 0.086 * 
LOW_int_rate 0.001 0.004 
    
0.001 0.007 
    
HIGH_int_rate -0.005 0.004 
    
-0.011 0.007 * 
   
GDP(t-1) -0.019 0.021 
 
-0.016 0.021 
 
-0.026 0.040 
 
-0.022 0.040 
 
INT_RATE -0.033 0.018 * -0.033 0.018 * -0.044 0.035 
 
-0.044 0.035 
 
CPI -0.003 0.007 
 
-0.003 0.007 
 
-0.005 0.014 
 
-0.005 0.014 
 
CONS 2.962 0.661 
 
3.184 0.654 *** 0.712 0.691 
 
0.743 0.690 
 
YEAR  yes     yes     yes     yes     
Number of observations 1392   
 
1392     656     656   
R
2
 
 
0.061 
  
0.059 
  
0.049 
  
0.044 
 
  F-value 4.21 *** F-value 4.56 *** 
Wald 
chi2(20) 
33.02 ** Wald chi2(20) 29.36 ** 
 
 
 
  
Table 6  Regression Results on Loan growth (Foreign ownership banks) 
  V 
 Foreign ownership banks 
  (9) (10) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. t 
ASSET(log) (t-1) -0.121 0.067 * -0.124 0.067 ** 
NPL(t-1) -0.320 0.120 *** -0.324 0.119 *** 
ROA(t-1) 0.124 0.353 
 
0.058 0.343 
 
LOW 0.010 0.120 
 
0.091 0.098 
 
HIGH -0.113 0.108 
 
-0.093 0.074 
 
LOW_int_rate 0.005 0.005 
    
HIGH_int_rate 0.002 0.006 
    
GDP(t-1) -0.045 0.028 
 
-0.049 0.028 * 
INT_RATE -0.055 0.025 ** -0.053 0.025 ** 
CPI -0.004 0.010 
 
-0.004 0.009 
 
CONS 2.986 1.076 *** 3.053 1.064 *** 
YEAR  yes     yes     
Number of 
observations  
518   
 
518   
R
2
 
 
0.128 
  
0.126 
 
  F-value 3.47 *** F-value 3.81 *** 
Note: “All banks” includes 118 banks: 4 state-owned banks, 34 forex banks, 30 non-forex banks, 15 joint banks, 9 foreign banks, and 26 regional development banks from 1997–2009. 
Models I, II, III, and V were estimated using the fixed effects model. Model IV was estimated using the random effects model. *** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1.  
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